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As foundations and public funders experiment with different social change models, especially
at the community level, they are searching – for the right partners, the right theories, the
right interventions, the right phasing, and the right effects. You would think that evaluation
would help in this search. Yet the typical funded evaluation ends just about when the grant
does and tends to concentrate on the experiment as a formalized process. Consequently, the
“rightness” of the project’s efforts is often not determined because not enough time has
occurred between initiative conception and the conclusion of outside support and evaluation.
Rarely does a funder support a look at what happens in the years after a grant ends. 
With a long-term view we can study the persistence of direct effects, the emergence 
of indirect effects, and changes in site characteristics over time. Do initiatives take off 
in new directions? Looking back, what lessons can we learn about effective, large-scale, 
comprehensive community change, alterations that might be highly significant but 
unintended? A retrospective look seems likely to yield insights about long-term success,
identify conditions that give rise to change that abides, and – by a kind of time travel 
triangulation – reinforce or challenge lessons learned elsewhere. 
Perhaps most importantly, it enables us to document what Nobel Prize-winning poet
Seamus Heaney called “the onset of possibility.” Heaney said that while a word or phrase
may inspire a poem, the process of crafting poetry more commonly involves a subtle, yet
almost palpable, recognition of the onset of possibility. So too with complex and highly
nuanced community change: how can funders, intermediary organizations in the assisting
business, community organizations, bureaucrats and government remain vigilant to 
promising opportunities stemming from hints of the “onset of possibilities?” The best 
way to begin to answer this question is to look back.
This report discusses such a retrospective study and the recognition of possibilities 
that would have gone undetected with a look at community change only in the short-run.
An open-ended exploration of planned and unplanned long-term outcomes, it was 
conducted a decade or so after a series of projects’ initial funding and at least a few years
after funding ended for the initiatives reviewed. The study was not an in-depth, quantitative
evaluation, analyzing the achievement of goals that evaluators defined a priori. Instead, 
it traces qualitatively the history and evolution of three very different kinds of foundation
grants in five very different urban settings – Boston, Dayton, Little Rock, Alameda
County/Oakland, and Savannah. All five of the projects aimed to foster new, comprehensive
change strategies; all five did so, to varying extents. All five aimed to build the communities’
capacity to produce enduring results; again, all five did so, to varying extents. Not all five
communities progressed as anticipated, but good and fascinating things did occur and are
still happening in each. What we can say with conviction is that the original grant support
helped establish a foundation for sustainable change. Each has its own experience and legacy
– its own change that abides.
The Annie E. Casey Foundation funded Andrew Hahn and a team of researchers from
Brandeis University’s Heller Graduate School, Center for Human Resources, to explore – 
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Introduction and Overview
Each has its own 
experience and 
legacy – its own 
change that abides.
in retrospect – the long-term effects of specific philanthropic investments. The researchers
conducted two or three site visits to each locale, conducted numerous phone conversations,
and reviewed pertinent written materials. The present publication condenses and highlights
their original report, A Guide for Grantmakers on the Long-Term Dividends of Philanthropic
Initiatives in Support of Families and Neighborhoods (1998), by Hahn and colleagues 
(available from Brandeis University, Heller Graduate School, Attention: Joan Walsh, 
Mail Stop 035, Waltham, MA 02454-9110) Our study, both this version and the longer ref-
erenced study above, were completed three years ago. Since there was a significant time lag,
the foundation felt it important to bring together participants from the initiatives as well as
other experts in the community change field to discuss the findings. The meeting in June
2000 helped shape the Epilogue to this study – See Chapter 5.
This study is part of a family of studies supported and published by the Annie E. Casey
Foundation (http://www.kidscount.org )and others in recent years. Some of the studies 
that relate to the themes in this report include:
• The Path of Most Resistance: Reflections on Lessons Learned from New Futures, 
the Annie E. Casey Foundation, Baltimore, Maryland, 1995
• Stories of Renewal: Community Building and the Future of Urban America: A Report 
from the Rockefeller Foundation by Joan Walsh, Rockefeller Foundation, New York, 
New York, January 1997.
• The Eye of the Storm: Ten Years on the Front Lines of New Futures: An Interview 
with Otis Johnson and Don Crary, by Joan Walsh, the Annie E. Casey Foundation, 
Baltimore, Maryland, 1998
In addition, a series of evaluation reports corresponding to New Futures is listed and
reviewed in the Brandeis report (A Guide for Grantmakers ...) cited above. Readers may 
also be interested in reports on other foundation initiatives, such as reports from the 
Pew Civic Change Project about 14 smaller communities, Planned Serendipity and 
Call it Effective (available from the Pew website: www.pew-partnership.org).
Relevance of the Study
In the years between the completion of this project and its publication by the Annie E.
Casey Foundation, this report has enjoyed life as a kind of "samizdat," not quite an under-
ground document copied illicitly but clearly a document that speaks to the interests of many
people as measured by inquiries. In one way or another, community activists, funders and
even evaluators aspire to "change that abides." Participating in a sustainable initiative not
only benefits local vulnerable constituencies but also those who practice the art and craft of
social change.
Simply put, participation in change that abides gives personal and spiritual meaning to the
work of community leaders and the many professionals who assist them on complex com-
munity initiatives. We think it is this possibility of meaning that has led to the widespread2
pre-publication interest in this report. As communities start new initiatives – for example
the 22 sites in the Annie E. Casey Foundation’s Making Connections effort (the centerpiece
of the Foundation’s multi-faceted effort to improve the life chances of vulnerable children by
helping to strengthen their families and neighborhoods) or any number of others – key leaders
anticipate the question: what will I have personally accomplished … what has taken hold?
Curiously, as interest in sustainability grows throughout the social change industry, little has
been written about it. Certainly our conceptions of sustainability have changed but with lit-
tle by way of formal expression. In the 1970s-1980s, many of us may have believed that sus-
tainability of promising efforts would be assured by rigorous evaluations of the initiatives.
This was a "sustainability by social engineering/identification of best practices" paradigm;
research findings were supposed to generate interest in replication and sustainability by pro-
moting the knowledge base of the field. Yet we learned that people didn’t always agree on
the import of the findings; that the uneven rigor of evaluation designs called into question
the findings; that audiences frequently did not exist at all for the utilization of findings; that
there were huge time delays between the studies and the institutionalization window; and,
that local people rarely adapted that which was studied in the first place, preferring instead
to add their stamp, often dramatically different, on the initiative originally evaluated. 
Even with this legacy, today we still enjoy social policy and social change by demonstrations
and pilots, hopeful but with little else to go on, that the evaluated projects will somehow be
institutionalized. 
Other models of sustainable social change are well known by readers of this report.
Acknowledging the limits of the evaluation approach, many donors and others have adopted
a leadership development approach. This model suggests that initiatives will be more likely
sustained if leadership is supported to nurture the institutionalization process, to see it
through the conception to sustainability chain. Other donors, combining both of the pre-
ceding paradigms – evaluation and leadership – look optimistically to community capacity,
that is, their emphasis becomes one of saturation programming in particular places, with
evaluation of promising practices and leadership development two of many core activities
focused on social capital and community problem-solving.
This report introduces and hints at all these themes. As a methodology, the Brandeis team
sees this as a prototype, but certainly not the last word, for studies that look at the long-
term effects of complex change efforts. 
Hindsight is invaluable for tracing the trajectory if any of funder-induced change, especially
hindsight over a number of years. It allows the researcher to test the persistence of change
efforts; to learn something interesting about "readiness" for change in multiple sites; to
record sleeper effects, that is, impacts that lie just below the surface and then emerge under
special circumstances; and the methodology allows qualitative researchers to study the equiv-
alent of "regression to the mean" or the phenomenon of observing community impacts
experiencing an initial halo but then to have community life return to business as usual.3
An Overview of the Findings
Not surprisingly, the interactions between foundations, grantees, and other community
members varied considerably among the five sites as they did the complex work of social
change. However, the patterns of outcomes and lessons that appeared can be traced 
back to virtually all dimensions of grantmaking, including who should get grants, the size 
of grants, the structure, and the length of time they cover. These insights may interest 
grantmakers, their intermediaries (subcontracted experts), community activists, social
change organizations, policymakers, media representatives, and others who seek to promote
community building. 
Two patterns of outcomes stand out and will be considered throughout this report: 
• Projects made continued progress after grants were completed. Those that had appeared
successful at the close of the initial grants grew and changed; those that had appeared 
less successful looked much more successful a few years later.
• Original grant-making intentions took unexpected, often unpredictable turns, 
and changed to meet local needs. The Brandeis researchers call their study (unofficially) 
“a formal look at serendipity.” Many of the recommendations in the original report 
discuss the need to embrace the unexpected.
The Five Sites 
By studying diverse communities and projects, the researchers could look at crosscutting
patterns and principles of interest to grantmakers, policymakers, and community leaders.
The five projects studied are all in mid-size urban communities but vary by region, state 
of revitalization, foundation activity level, expectations, outcomes, and structure: three
youth collaboratives, a leadership development initiative, and a neighborhood health center. 
Funding for three sites – Little Rock, Arkansas, Savannah, Georgia, and Dayton, Ohio –
came from the New Futures initiative, a five-year (1987-1993) Casey Foundation program
of systems reform and quality-of-life outcomes for low-income youth. New Futures focused
on school reform, student retention, academic success, youth employability, youth 
development, risk reduction, avoidance of teen pregnancy and early parenting, and 
neighborhood strengthening. New Futures sites also developed a cadre of case managers 
to assist individual youth and their families. This is an example of large multi-year grants
saturating a few places with financial and capacity-building opportunities: each site received
approximately $10 million over five years (matched with local resources). 
Savannah and Little Rock shared many characteristics. Conditions were ripe for 
community renewal in both cities: the Annie E. Casey Foundation added momentum 
to a process already underway. In both cities, a well-established civic and political elite had
traditionally made key decisions. Thus, the task of mobilizing critical institutional support
was less daunting than in communities with more diverse decision-makers. For both cities, 
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a major national foundation grant represented a windfall, in dollars, prestige, and visibility:
the local philanthropic culture and links with national foundations were weak in both cities.
Seen as success stories at the end of New Futures funding, both continue efforts that look
very much like the initial concept. The projects enriched the stock of social capital in 
both cities, nurtured skilled and independent leaders, and developed a culture of civic
engagement, enhancing the communities’ abilities to address important youth issues. 
A note of interest is that, since 1990, while violent crime in Arkansas is up fifty-five percent,
in Little Rock it’s down thirty percent. One factor present in this community and not 
in others is the attention given to youth development.
Dayton, a city known for “good government,” saw New Futures as a once-in-a-lifetime
opportunity. With the infusion of funds, the city focused on school improvement, including
a middle school case management strategy, a citywide business-school partnership to 
promote youth employment, a K-12 sexuality curriculum, “The Collaborative” (a powerful
community-wide policy board including prominent local decision-makers), and an active
Youth Advisory Board providing input from young people. Dayton illustrates the challenge
in determining an intervention’s ultimate success. It committed most of its New Futures
resources to the public schools, where relatively minor short-term improvements were 
realized. In 1993, the program was considered weak, even a failure, in many ways.
Hindsight, however, suggests a different story. Dayton appears to have laid a foundation 
for community change after all. Community activists did not disappear. Revitalization 
looks different from the way it was envisioned a decade ago, but it lives on nevertheless. 
In the Fall 1993, New Futures changed its name to the Youth and Family Collaborative 
and within two years took on the challenge of responding to a state initiative it had a hand
in inspiring, namely for each county to form a Family and Children First Council. It has
been said that the state’s invitation in the early 1990s to counties to form FCFC’s was based
directly on the then Governor Voinovich’s desire to see something like New Futures spread
to other counties. FCPC became the official successor to New Futures for Montgomery
County in 1995.
During the second half of the 1990s in Dayton – and as a result of these efforts – all public
schools hired full-time nurses and expanded school-based health services (although sadly,
Dayton Public Schools, due to a budget crisis, have been forced to lay off more than half 
the school nurses in the 1999 school year, a situation that is once again under review by
children and youth advocates.) A truancy prevention/early intervention program is reducing
absenteeism in the primary grades. A community-based adolescent health center has been
created. Another, though less direct, result is a major one-stop job center that brings 
together services from more than 40 local employment and human service agencies. 
Finally, as noted, the Ohio State legislature has mandated the establishment of a FCFC 
in every county. 
Casey Foundation funds also supported the fourth project, the Leadership/Technical Team
(LTT) initiative in Alameda County, California (focused in the city and surrounding5
So simple. 
So straightforward. 
So obvious. 
Yet these 
recommendations 
are, in many 
quarters, still seen as
“noise” along the way…
County of Oakland). In 1992, the Casey Foundation gave $210,000 to the Oakland-based
Urban Strategies Council for the LTT. An independent project – i.e., not part of a broader 
foundation initiative or multi-site effort – the LTT convened city and county agency leaders,
along with non-profit staff and business representatives, to develop a systems-reform agenda
for Alameda County through collaborative decision-making. The LTT’s story shows vividly
how even a modest investment can help create a framework for meaningful social change.
While this project did not come to fruition as originally envisioned, it became absorbed 
in a larger, state-supported initiative – a Policy Academy – to explore ways to pool funding
streams for new approaches to improve services and outcomes for families. 
The fifth project is Boston’s Codman Square Health Center, a community-based 
ambulatory care and multi-service center founded in 1975 by neighborhood activists. 
The health center’s mission is to improve the physical, social, and mental health of the 
residents of this low-income neighborhood. The health center’s story begins with an $18,000
W. K. Kellogg Foundation Community-Oriented Primary Care fellowship, intended 
as an incentive for physicians to increase their community involvement. It became a way 
to combine community organizing and health outreach through Community Health Workers
(CHWs), who went door-to-door, talking with residents about health issues, community
concerns, and community services and resources. The Community Health Education Team
(CHET), the department housing the CHWs, supplements and complements the health
center’s clinical services. CHET’s manager, a community health nurse by background, sees
herself as a bridge between CHET and the health center’s clinical services. The original
modest grant thus started an enduring tradition listening to and organizing the community;
broadened the center’s agenda; led to subsequent grants from diverse funding sources; and
enhanced community participation, capacity, social entrepreneurship, and leadership devel-
opment. The health center is widely viewed as a catalyst and vehicle for neighborhood trans-
formation and family strengthening – in much the same way and toward the same goals as
did initiatives entering communities through the education or social-service sectors. This sug-
gests value in looking at multiple potential points of entrance for community intervention. 
The remainder of this review is organized around two of the study’s principal 
recommendations for funders, their intermediaries and local operating entities:
• Cultivate “ripeness” for change and seek opportunities to enhance social capital, and, 
• Make a commitment to the long term and operate flexibly and respectfully during 
the process.
So simple. So straightforward. So obvious. Yet these recommendations are, in many 
quarters, still seen as “noise” along the way to some set of desired outcomes such as reducing
risk behaviors or improving specific conditions in neighborhoods, education bureaucracies
or government. This report, however, suggests these principles lay the groundwork for 
“the onset of possibility” – which may be not only the best we can do, but the best we 
could want to do. 6
Funding investments are more likely to succeed if the community is willing and able to
invest itself in the process – if it is “ripe” for change. What makes one community ready 
for change and another inflexible or reluctant? A “ripe” community likely includes a widely
shared urgency for action, a positive policy climate, the presence of civic capital, strong local
capacity, and/or the potential for reinvestment. Paradoxically, however, the characteristics
that contribute to ripeness may instead create a stake in the current agenda. Strong 
communities that think they know where they are going and have a plan to get there may
be less likely to want to start over and less open to outsiders’ ideas about change. Before
jumping into a “ready” community, a funder or intermediary must check and re-check 
each party’s understanding of concepts and strategies, to determine the degree to which
stakeholders are in sync. It is important to anticipate and recognize different perceptions. 
To some, for example, promoting collaboration means developing healthier working 
relationships among colleagues and competitors. To others, it suggests averting rather 
than confronting conflicts and backing away from change. 
The five communities studied were ripe for change: 
Savannah’s Chatham County is known as “the kingdom of Chatham,” in reference to 
its perceived isolation from the social movements that transformed other parts of the south.
At the start of New Futures in 1987, Savannah was emerging from extended economic 
and social stagnation. African-Americans were notably absent from visible leadership roles.
Further, as an influx of young homesteaders and entrepreneurs transformed the scene, 
black residents found themselves priced out of neighborhoods where their families had 
lived for generations. A series of high-visibility crimes in a low-income neighborhood known
as “Area C” added impetus to a growing coalition for change. During this period, City
Manager Don Mendonsa assembled maps showing the overlay and concentration of crime,
teen pregnancy, school dropout rates, unemployment, poor housing, and poor health. 
Based on the links revealed between social problems and entrenched poverty, he concluded
that Savannah was risking its future growth and prosperity by remaining a “tale of two
cities.” In addition, residents in poor neighborhoods needed public support to reinvest 
in improving their quality of life. To that end, Mendonsa trained community organizers 
to knock on doors and persuade people to come to meetings and to dream: 
Suppose you went to bed and woke up ten years from now, twenty years from now. 
What kind of neighborhood do you want to see? How would it be different? 
City Hall, the organizers, and the residents then identified actions that would lead to
change. But Mendonsa found that these efforts still didn’t reach “the most vulnerable – 
the poorest of the poor.” This convinced Mendonsa of the need to target resources narrowly
toward improving children’s life chances, in part through addressing the dysfunction of 
public institutions – particularly schools. The Casey Foundation thus found a like-minded,
strategically placed ally who was more than willing to invest his own political capital, as well
as requisite matching funds from the city, to establish the Youth Futures Authority (YFA) 
to oversee policy and programs for children and families. 
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Cultivate “ripeness” for change and seek 
opportunities to enhance social capital
Suppose you went 
to bed and woke up 
ten years from now,
twenty years from now. 
What kind of 
neighborhood do you
want to see? How
would it be different? 
Little Rock, the largest city and capital of the “The Natural State,” boasts a diverse 
economy, but, especially at the start of New Futures, its inner-city neighborhoods struggled
with inadequate housing, crime, and unstable families. Despite traditional intervention
efforts, resources had not often made their way into these neighborhoods. Projects to
upgrade infrastructure with federal funds had been largely unsuccessful, in part because 
they ignored input from residents, reducing the likelihood of neighborhood buy-in. Before
the New Futures era, community leaders were forthright about Little Rock’s problems 
and searching actively for solutions to overcome the barriers they faced. When New Futures
brought the resources and impetus for a collaborative focus on youth, the city was poised 
to capitalize on the opportunity.
In the Dayton metropolitan area, as in others, prosperity stopped short of many inner-city
neighborhoods. Still, with a long-standing reputation for commitment to good government,
the city seemed ripe for change in 1987. Dayton had already taken innovative steps to
reshape its human service agencies into a more coherent system. New Futures seemed to 
be a unique opportunity to build on those beginnings and expand the collaborative process
to include the schools, the juvenile court system, and other sectors. 
Alameda County/Oakland conditions were also ripe for change. Categorical funding
streams hindered residents’ access to social services and local leaders’ ability to coordinate
and collaborate. City- and county-level systems changes were needed and desired. The LTT,
part of an effort to join the Oakland Unified School District with major county agency
directors, represented a new and, in the funder’s estimation, logical way to promote 
the involvement of prominent individuals and their organizations in systems change. 
The Codman Square Health Center’s neighborhood was poor, fragmented, and distressed
when the W. K. Kellogg Foundation awarded the Community Oriented Primary Care
Fellowship in the late 1980s. The fellowship proposal’s stated goal – to decrease infant 
mortality rates – mirrored a citywide concern about low-income neighborhoods’ high rates.
The first step in the fellowship was to conduct a survey to promote residents’ involvement
in achieving the goal. Unexpectedly, however, community members placed a higher priority
on addressing crime, violence, lack of economic development, and lack of opportunity 
for youth. The health center proposed changing course to respond to the community’s 
concerns. The Kellogg Foundation respected the findings – and the health center’s ripeness –
and approved the redirection. 
In all five communities, the somewhat academic-sounding concept of “social capital” 
– having social change strategies build on indigenous social networks, leadership, and 
talent – took on real and meaningful importance.
To foster long-term, substantive community change, a funder must enhance a community’s
social capital. Social capital encompasses human as well as financial assets that contribute 
to a community’s ability to work collaboratively, learn continuously, capitalize on 
opportunities, and create a climate conducive to change. Essential ingredients from 8
a funding perspective are giving the grantee operating freedom; using the foundation’s 
“vetting” role; recognizing the importance of leaders’ vision and creativity; developing 
leaders and supporting their career trajectories; leveraging resources; and creating 
a culture of civic engagement. All of this takes time. It is no wonder that improvements
made possible by foundation initiatives often go unnoticed in short-term studies.
Promoting Community Ownership
A first step in enhancing social capital is promoting community ownership of the program.
To that end, the funder and community must overcome obstacles to trust. Members of
inner-city communities such as those featured in this report are often isolated from nearby
political, social, economic, and cultural centers. At the same time, they often – rationally 
– impose a certain amount of isolation on themselves: residents have many reasons not 
to trust their neighbors or local “officials” – agency representatives, business people, school
system administrators, even middle class community agency managers. Successful funders
must build consciously on the community’s character and history to inspire trust – and
develop capacity. As one New Futures participant put it, 
“You cannot give a change model to a community. You need to say, ‘what is your model 
of change’ and work with them to strengthen it”
A second observer put it a little differently:
In order to help a community build its capacity to reach its goals, you need to find the pulse 
of that community, what makes it pump blood. It is different from community to community
(and neighborhood to neighborhood), depending on the leaders, history, and life experiences 
of the key participants. Until you understand that, you can’t influence them.
Communication about respective roles and goals is crucial to establishing trust. Foundations
must not set lofty, unachievable goals, must ensure mutual understanding of goals and
plans, and must design programs that reflect the same goals as the stated ones.
Leveta Hale, a former Little Rock New Futures case manager, reflects on differing 
expectations. Early on, she remembers, she thought New Futures “was about ‘institutional
change.’ That meant that the lives of the families and children receiving services would be
measurably improved, and that the systems would look at families and children differently,
not just as powerless people who needed to be ‘fixed.’ “So…as case managers [we began] 
to document all the barriers to services that people faced, and all the barriers to interagency
cooperation. And we sent this information to the board of New Futures, and…they actually
said, ‘don’t send us this stuff anymore because we can’t do anything with it. It’s too big. 
It’s too much’.” 
Similarly, Savannah’s Chisholm noted, “People in the community…don’t want you 
to determine what the policies and programs are going to be, who their leaders should 
be. That was part of the New Futures mistake. They planted [the initiative] in different
cities and [said] ‘this is what we are going to do.’ [Later in the project, they] began to ask
themselves, ‘Who is not here at the table? Whose voices do we need to listen to more?’ 9
“You cannot give 
a change model to a 
community. You need
to say, ‘what is your
model of change’ 
and work with them 
to strengthen it”
And they realized that the people who were not at the table were the people working most
closely with the populations the Casey Foundation was trying to impact.” 
New Futures leaders in Dayton pointed out that, while New Futures was described as 
comprehensive and community-wide, the key outcome measures were dropout rates, course
failures, grades, and other school-related numbers. A participant said, “We didn’t look at
child welfare, juvenile court problems, [or other issues].…Educators felt they were under fire
and were the only system being measured.” The measures’ message was that the schools were
accountable, and everyone else could stand outside the fray and snipe.
Developing Leaders and Empowering Communities
As the Brandeis researchers studied the impact of the Casey Foundation’s initiatives in 
Little Rock and Savannah, they noted that the Foundation generally modeled behavior 
that produced a series of positive but often unanticipated effects: 
When we look for spin-offs, we should look at how the foundation’s stance and style 
as manager of a social change initiative established a norm for the New Futures site 
directors who in turn adopted a similar risk-taking and entrepreneurial approach to their
sponsorship of local community initiatives. Leadership sets the tone locally but also in 
the funding community. In the New Futures sites, the Foundation’s leadership was central.
Funder behavior can affect social capital profoundly, particularly in the areas of developing
leaders and empowering communities. But providing a training ground for leaders
through foundation initiatives is often not seen as worthy or important. In all five 
sites, to varying extents, the funders enhanced local leaders’ sense of confidence and 
competence, encouraged their intellectual independence, and served an “anointing” role,
signaling that agencies and individuals were worthy of support. The sites then used this
social capital to help others in the community, serving as a kind of second-generation
leadership incubator. In New Futures, for example, the Casey Foundation’s top executives
promoted risk-taking and creativity among community practitioners. These grantees 
challenge and dispute. They articulate viewpoints reflecting experience in low-income
communities. They are at the table with funders, not as tongue-tied supplicants, 
but as collaborators whose valuable first-hand knowledge helps to close the gap between
policy and practice. Grantee independence and self-assertiveness stands as a testament 
to a funder’s commitment to enhancing social capital. It also enriches and expands 
the discourse shaping the foundation’s strategic thinking. 
Of the three New Futures sites in this study, the Casey Foundation’s technical assistance
(TA) efforts may have scored their highest marks in Savannah. According to Gaye Smith,
interim YFA managing director, the Casey Foundation’s TA approach communicated respect
and caring: “The [Casey Foundation] staffing was wonderful.... Every month we’d have a
conversation, set up a list of things that needed to happen, and they started happening ...
but without taking over the community’s role. ... We needed that external push because
there were some things that it was easier to hear from someone else than for one of us to say.10
Unfortunately, our experience is not the norm in projects of this kind.” She credits the
Casey Foundation with creating a strong sense of community leadership and ownership.
Before New Futures, she recalls, cynicism accompanied most relationships with funders: 
You tell the funders what they want to hear; you do the budget the way they want, 
you implement the plan they gave you. They take their data, they go home happy. It doesn’t
make you a confident partner… As a result of our Casey Foundation experience, we’re a lot
more empowered about not getting into...funding relationships where an outside entity is going 
to come into our community, plunk down a bit of money, suck data out of us, and leave 
us without any capacity or result we can use.
In Little Rock, Leveta Hale explains, the anointing role was pivotal: “prestige…helped
recruit people and bring them to the table. People were attracted by the Casey Foundation
name. It provided a higher profile… That Brandeis University was involved as a TA provider
around youth issues was attractive as well.... It was the place you had to be. If you were 
not at the table, it was embarrassing.” This benefit grew exponentially, as the original group
went on to model what they had learned for other colleagues, thereby serving as a second
force of change agents
In Dayton, many participants and observers considered meetings of the Executive Directors
Group exemplary TA sessions. The exchanges for many stakeholders in the community 
and county provided opportunities to share ideas, gain the buy-in of local leaders invited 
to attend, and allow people in comparable positions in other agencies to hear each other. 
At the Codman Square Health Center, grantee independence is associated with leadership
building. The health center’s success with taking the initiative with funders has helped it in
turn to support meaningful neighborhood participation (e.g., representation on the health
center’s board and staff ) and nurture community leaders. 
Alameda County had relatively less hands-on Foundation involvement – reflecting, in part,
the LTT’s single-site status and the Casey Foundation’s confidence in the Urban Strategies
Council. Still, the foundation’s behavior engendered leadership. Every LTT member inter-
viewed said the Casey Foundation-financed TA led to benefits that persist. The LTT’s for-
mer director, Susan Lubeck, recalls:
The relationship with the Casey Foundation was great. They were colleagues – very acces-
sible and not bureaucratic. We knew they were interested in what we were learning, they
were there to consult with, but they didn’t impose anything on us.
The experience in all five communities suggests that developing leaders and supporting 
key community members’ career trajectories contribute significantly to social capital.
Nevertheless, as the full report describes in more detail, this is often overlooked as 
an important part of an initiative in and of itself. 
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Edward Chisholm embodies this legacy in Savannah. An African-American in his mid-30s
and originally a YFA case manager, Chisholm moved on to head Healthy Start, intended 
to reduce Chatham County’s infant mortality rates. From there he spent a year as a Casey
Foundation Fellow (a leadership development program for those who aspire to policy and
management positions in youth-related agencies), and is now special assistant to the mayor
of Savannah. This notable, perhaps unintended, example, which was certainly not captured
in early documentation, represents a genuine contribution to the social fabric of a community.
Leveta Hale also worked her way up from a case manager position. New Futures, she said,
“gave me the exposure, the contacts, and the networks.…Lots of [us]…really got turned on
to the issues of public policy and children and families [and] went on…to become executive
directors, program directors…. [Our] perspective is a little broader than simply feeling 
‘I’m just going to provide my own little service here and that’s where it stops.’ There really is
an attitude that ‘I’ve got to get out of the box and bring other people [into the conversation]
and communicate…to get [children and families’] needs met.’…it certainly was a springboard,
and the training that I got…was a tremendous investment that paid off. That first group 
of case managers was probably some of the best-trained workers in the city… The involvement
of the Casey Foundation staff was really important [in terms of ] how we thought about our-
selves and our future, how that enabled us to move on and do other things.”
The Casey Foundation, says Little Rock’s Tom Dalton, can take credit for “grooming” 
New Futures board members who went on to occupy other positions of influence; 
he himself is now the Governor’s advisor on human services reform! 
In Alameda County, former LTT member Joan Davies, who continued to work on school-
linked services issues with the Interagency Children’s Policy Council (ICPC) (the successor
to the state-sponsored Policy Academy) after LTT disbanded, explains: 
The personal relationships were invaluable. I still count the original folks as friends, and we’ve
gone on to work on other things. It taught me the value of extended dialogue and discussion
on these issues. And I grew professionally.... I really miss it – the opportunity to talk about
tough issues with smart people from different fields, and to be exposed to cutting-edge thinking
from around the country.
Yet several informants noted that leadership development in fragile communities carries 
a certain risk. As grass roots leaders are identified and supported, they may move up to 
positions of higher responsibility within the community – or they may leave the community
behind. The challenge is to enrich the neighborhood’s intellectual and motivational
resources so that if one leader moves on, others remain. Analysts and activists are beginning
to recognize the issue of “community brain-drain.” Still, even before tackling this issue, the
field of social change needs to acknowledge that leadership matters and is an appropriate
way to measure success.
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Collaboration Leads to Civic Engagement
The communities studied, like most others, had a hodgepodge of categorical programs, 
each with its own funding streams, eligibility requirements, and performance standards.
Education, health, and service agencies worked discontinuously, inconsistently, and even 
at cross-purposes. Policymakers and planners rarely welcomed community perspectives.
Researchers, advocates, and funders tended to agree that this disjointed “non-system” failed
to meet the communities’ multiple, overlapping needs. Collaboration was therefore seen as 
a crucial change strategy. An early New Futures priority, for example, was establishing youth
collaboratives, in which stakeholders would set to work on coordination problems; establish
and monitor indicators such as student achievement, dropout rates, and youth employment;
and promote community and institutional accountability. The model assumed that good,
locally generated information, in influential advocates’ hands, would lead to meaningful
reform, especially in allocating government and school resources. 
According to former Savannah case manager Michael Porter, however, the YFA board
appeared reluctant to challenge the status quo. Creating a structure for collaboration became
an end in itself, a substitute rather than an instrument for systems change. According to
Edward Chisholm in Savannah, with the benefit of a retrospective look, it took time for 
the excitement of collaborating to give way to the real substance of what collaboration is
supposed to accomplish. He notes, that “when you go out and talk to neighborhood groups,
neighborhood association presidents, you find that people have been working for years to
make a life better in their particular environments, their necks of the woods. But it took
time for the big collaboratives to think about collaborating with the neighborhoods over
there…This is changing…now, we do this as a team…”
In Little Rock, former city manager Tom Dalton, New Futures Board President for four
years, blames pervasive turmoil and divergent interests within the school system for lack 
of collaboration and institutional change. From 1987 to 1993, there were six different
superintendents. Furthermore, a series of court orders, in effect for more than two decades,
“always captured center stage in the hearts and minds of the superintendent and the school
board,” he says. Asked about New Future’s lasting impacts, however, Dalton cites the central
role of collaboration: “there continues to be a table at which many diverse interests sit 
to discuss youth-related issues.” His colleague Boyd Ward, New Futures deputy director
(1989-1994), adds, “Everybody thinks they know how to collaborate but they don’t…
New Futures was the place where folks…learned what it takes to make collaboration work.
And those skills have been carried on in other ways on other projects. ... It wasn’t as 
if we were the only people who were dreaming up collaborative projects, but we had the
resources, the time, and the staff to facilitate those processes, so we became the hub for 
a lot of efforts. Little Rock is a small community, and the same people have traditionally
been tapped to do planning and policy work. We broadened that network, we brought 
in folks who had never before been invited to the table.” People who had never met forged
relationships that in turn had important offshoots. The city housing authority chief, Lee Jones,
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a long-time New Futures board member, says the board “brought together everybody from
the mayor and the chief of police to neighborhood leaders.... You build relationships that
way. Policymakers become more inclusive in their decision-making.”
Dayton’s Families and Children First Council (FCFC), the successor organization to New
Futures and the community’s prominent human service policy body, took on the complex
task of bringing together public and private agencies and establishing common human 
service policy goals. It also formed the Executive Directors’ Group (a network of human
service agency directors) and the Service Brokers Network (mid-level agency staff designated
as interagency problem-solvers), and hired a school-human services liaison. As leaders noted,
many can’t “speak the human services language,” so they brought the schools into the
Directors’ discussions and built a strong, cooperative relationship between school and agency
directors. From early in New Futures, however, initiative leaders and the school administration
differed on goals and priorities: New Futures targeted middle and high schools, while 
the district superintendent’s priority was early childhood and elementary education.
Additionally, though both school and community leaders wanted to improve the schools,
each often faulted the other for lack of progress. Community leaders saw the schools as slow
and resistant. To them, it seemed that school personnel refused to accept the initiative and
move ahead with reform. Educators, on the other hand, felt the community was disclaiming
responsibility for the schools and for children’s outcomes, and was one-sidedly criticizing
hard-working teachers and administrators. The good news is that, as human services for 
students evolved, so did support for school-related social services. A superintendent said, 
“New Futures changed my attitude.... The traditional view of social services is someone coming
to disrupt the classroom. Now I see the value more.” 
In this instance, the funder might have done well to understand more about school-
community relationships during the proposal process. In addition, though the city appeared
poised for reform, no one wanted to take Dayton’s “good government” apart just to keep 
an outside organization happy. One observer noted, “We hire smart bureaucrats and have 
a healthy respect for the bureaucracy. So if someone comes in and says, ‘we’re going 
to change things through collaboration,’ it does not happen easily.” And it takes time.
Yet by 1993, progress was achieved. As the New Futures initiative was ending, Brother
Raymond Fitz, New Futures and FCFC Chairman, chaired a countywide task force 
to examine child protection services. One of the task force’s principal recommendations,
pushed by Brother Raymond Fitz (S.M., Ph.D.) based on his New Futures experience, was
to establish a single collaborative to bring together county agencies and nonprofit organizations.
Alameda County’s LTT adopted an unusual collaborative building approach. The Urban
Strategies Council purchased team members’ time, to encourage accountability and 
responsibility-sharing among individuals and agencies and to compensate for adding 
responsibilities to full schedules. The Council also attempted to let the Team develop its
own mission, goals, and work plan, again to heighten accountability and a sense of shared
ownership. In the first six months, the group did some relationship building but made little14
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progress toward an agenda. The Council then obtained professional facilitation for the LTT,
which helped promote better communication and planning, and established a formal 
steering committee to plan its agenda. But it was too late for the LTT to produce dramatic
short-term outcomes. Communication among groups with little history of collaboration 
was often strained. The LTT had to confront significant differences and lingering reticence
and suspicion among the community-based agencies, business people, and public 
agency leaders with whom they needed strong relationships in order to move forward. 
The Council’s commendable efforts foundered on these political tensions. Moreover, the
steering committee members were mid-level, implementation-oriented agency representatives
whose caution and inability to commit their agencies to new endeavors were further 
hindrances. The committee also lacked the reality check for plans and strategies which 
senior agency directors could have provided. 
For the Codman Square Health Center, collaboration was more organic. Defining health
as “more than health care” and thinking of “the community as patient,” the health center
has played an important role in transforming the large urban neighborhood of which it is a
part. Before the initial W. K. Kellogg grant, the center had worked with churches, nonprofit
groups, businesses, and other civic organizations to form the Codman Square Neighborhood
Council. The Council acted to strengthen families, improve service delivery, and enhance
the quality of life. Leadership, bolstering stabilizing influences, identifying natural collaborative
relationships, building community capacity, and improving access to health care have 
deepened the health center’s ties to the community and helped it help others find common
ground on which to collaborate. However, when a foundation required collaboration with
another health center, it drained time and resources away from higher-priority activities,
according to health center staff.
Assessing Increases in Social Capital 
A variety of outcomes may demonstrate an increase in social capital. Two examples 
are influencing public policy and leveraging additional public and private investments. 
According to Mary Willoughby of the Savannah YFA, “We were one of the only communities
in the state that was gathering information across several agencies and using that to look 
at the whole picture. The state followed our lead, so instead of asking communities to 
give isolated annual data, they started to ask for baseline and trend information…We also
pioneered a common intake strategy…We’ve had work groups on it for five, six years. 
So, when a new state Human Resources Commissioner came in, he invited us to be 
a partner in piloting a new system. We formed a local committee to work on the software…
Because we had this experience as a community, we were able to speak with one voice to 
the state. There were two or three times in the process where as a community, we hit the
wall, and said basically, if you design a system that doesn’t reach the goal of a value-added
experience for the consumer – the person seeking service – and the front-line worker, then
we’re off the team. And by being a pretty aggressive partner, we’ve changed their behavior.”
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Little Rock New Futures enjoys credit for a direct policy intervention that has brought
institutional credibility to the concept of prevention. Largely through Tom Dalton’s New
Futures efforts, Little Rock voters approved a 1994 half-cent sales tax increase. The proceeds
helped create and sustain a network of nearly thirty community-based programs that 
provide a base for employing and training youth workers. 
Boyd Ward offers another example of how New Futures strengthened the community’s 
ability to affect public policy. “The Youth Initiative Project (twelve YIP sites still operate 
in Little Rock) was a gang intervention effort that sort of came up spontaneously because 
we had a staff person from the community who had a concept, had a dream, and went out
and sold that dream. New Futures had the financial resources to make it happen. Eventually,
the city government bought into the concept.” 
The Codman Square Health Center not only continues to survey residents about service
quality, satisfaction, and community health, but it also pursues information on other 
community issues as well. In 1998, the Center established the Civic Health Institute as 
its public policy arm. The Institute works with neighborhood residents and organizations 
to increase participation in community life and to inform and influence community leaders,
public officials, educators, researchers, and health care organizations about how efforts such
as theirs build stronger families and neighborhoods. Moreover, the center’s initial $18,000
Kellogg Foundation grant allowed it to garner additional financial support from the Kellogg
Foundation as well as the Kresge Foundation, an anonymous donor, and the state Public
Health Department. A key part of building on the original grant was a subsequent Kellogg
Foundation grant for the Community Health Workers (described earlier). This further
enhanced the health center’s image, credibility, and opportunities for further funding. 
The story behind this leveraging is leadership. Center staff learned to push for their agenda
and identify flexible, progressive funders. 
Codman Square is, in fact, a prime example of social entrepreneurship in developing 
and implementing community-wide reform strategies. The health center has extended 
and increased its resources by linking health care and community organizing in mutually
advantageous ways. In its role as a community resource, the center serves as an incubator 
or fiscal agent for community organizations unable to start a new project on their own 
or incorporate as 501(c)(3) organizations. With this service, the health center builds 
community capacity, develops additional local leaders, and helps non-profits that, in turn,
further strengthen the community. Whether you call this leverage, survival, capacity 
building, growth, or investment, it implies that a grant’s scale is sometimes less important
than how it is used and what is done with it. 
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Make a commitment to the long term and operate flexibly
and respectfully during the process 
It seems reasonable to expect a foundation grant, especially a large one, to change the 
course of a few organizations. It may not be reasonable to expect it to transform the whole 
community. History, local personalities, and inertia, among other factors, stand in the way –
especially given the short time horizons favored by many funders. Moreover, the foundation
investment is small when compared to the community’s other resources and institutions. 
It takes patience, persistence, flexibility, and a long-term perspective to support an environment
ripe for change; to build trust among community sectors and between the community 
and the funder; to solder relationships; to increase capacity and leadership; and to generate
the social capital needed to sustain success. 
Not surprisingly, probably every survey of foundation grantees has yielded the grantees’ 
recommendation for multi-year funding to build community trust and get the work done.
Foundations’ and grantees’ time horizons, however, often differ radically. The case studies
illuminate the importance of a long-term horizon to catalyze change that abides. With time,
there are more significant instances – as we have seen thus far – of “change that abides” 
than commonly thought.
“Long term” is the operative phrase. Looking only at short-term quantifiable outcomes risks
missing important long-term outcomes related to building social capital. The most meaningful
results may not be reducible to a simple, short-term assessment. Financial planners advise
that committing to the market for the long term yields the best results. The same principle
applies to community revitalization. Time frames must allow seeing the forest and the trees.
Long-term evaluation or documentation is critical to discern crosscutting themes among
project sites. Community-building and systems-reform initiatives – which should include
the factors mentioned, such as building trust, developing leaders, cultivating new 
inter-agency relationships, and pursuing a vision collaboratively – take time to succeed. 
The Brandeis retrospective certainly documents many of these “time matters” themes. 
To help illustrate this, we turn to a source of great anxiety to communities, the timing 
of evaluation requirements.
Some informants saw the New Futures evaluation process as intrusive and counterproductive:
lots of people coming in and out, reports to respond to every few months, and a rigid 
conception of goals and outcomes. The major issue, however, was the sense that evaluation
too soon and too public served as a battering ram rather than a positive tool. In the words
of one collaborative member, “every time the evaluation team came to town, it felt like we
stepped back six months.” Said another, “We knew we were struggling. But it made it more
difficult to have the evaluators looking over our shoulder, especially since the Casey
Foundation wanted wide distribution of the reports. It was an added obstacle…
Having that level of intense scrutiny held over your head, knowing it would be published 
each year, that was hard. I remember having the second-year evaluation on my desk 
and the media technical assistance people calling to help with damage control. I felt I was 
in the vortex of a tornado... 
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Along with time, money matters over the long haul. Money generally makes a difference
and multi-year funding makes a more substantial difference. Grantor resources – though
they are not necessarily the overriding factor – can help the community leverage more
resources. A grantor’s multi-year commitment goes even further by instilling community
confidence that the commitment is real and the site is not at the mercy of a fad. 
Each of the five sites in this report experienced various successes that appeared only over
time – such as nurturing second- and third-generation replacements for leaders who move
on; the program’s ability to sustain itself, financially and otherwise, after the initial funding
stream ends; and simple longevity. According to Savannah’s Edward Chisholm, 
One of the indicators of the success of New Futures is simply that it’s been around so long. 
People at the community level are used to programs that come and go – what public 
education activist Carl Marburger called the “hula hoop syndrome”: project staff performs
on a rigid time table with little up-front time for community trust building and buy-in,
then leaves on the prescribed date without ongoing support. Not surprisingly, those studying
the project conclude, “it didn’t work,” long before significant effects could be realized. 
This, in turn, leads to community cynicism as community leaders and service providers see
the project as just one more outside intervention using them as guinea pigs. Says Chisholm,
“We [had too many] youth who were used to having adults come into their lives, being
there for awhile, and as soon as the kids began to trust them, they were gone. It left a very
bitter taste. The longevity of New Futures is one of its hallmarks. And people are now seeing
it as part of the community.” Chisholm’s colleague Gaye Smith adds, 
“What the commitment to multi-year funding did was to lend a stability and permanence 
to the effort. Having dealt with an awful lot of foundations [and] federal grants, I’ve come 
to understand that a time frame of short duration means that some of the most valuable
learnings and impacts happen after the close of the books.” 
“Without some longer window for impact and evaluation, you really…only make marginal
change…you can’t build something that is new and comprehensive. What the size, scale,
and duration of the Casey Foundation investment did was to challenge this community 
to think far outside the box in ways that we would never have dreamed of. The foundation
created the place and opportunity [and] helped unleashed forces that have permanently
altered the landscape. We’ll never go back to the way it was before.”
The Dayton New Futures initiative has produced positive programmatic and systemic
changes that were not visible six years ago, when the official program ended. Dayton can
now boast a leadership role in several programmatic and service-delivery initiatives with
New Futures roots. The Families and Children First Council (FCFC) and the Directors’ 
and Service Brokers’ groups represent collaborative “systems change” vehicles that grew 
out of New Futures; the outcomes mentioned in Section I are similarly related. Although
critics say that much of the $20 million associated with the original five-year project 
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was spent on programs that were flawed at best, and many participants believe that the 
original stakeholders were overly optimistic, the foundation money brought people together
and inspired them to work toward sustainable change. New Futures represented an opportu-
nity to do something important. Although its impact on the public schools was limited,
except in the realm of social-service delivery (nothing to trivialize in today’s era of Beacons
and other school-service-neighborhood efforts), many observers believe that New Futures
did help the city move in important new directions and “change the conversation” in impor-
tant ways. New Futures laid the groundwork for a new generation of community-wide col-
laborations and an ongoing community commitment to improving services for children and
families. The Dayton initiative with its dual urban and metropolitan or county emphasis
remains committed to collaboration as a valuable process for bringing about change, and has
continued (if not increased) its investment in core New Futures ideas and mechanisms. The
Montgomery County FCFC has taken the New Futures experience in developing local lead-
ership up a significant notch. At the state level, New Futures was instrumental in passing
legislation mandating the establishment of FCFCs – in essence expanding the New Futures
collaborative idea statewide. All eighty-eight Ohio counties now have FCFCs. As one
observer commented, “I don’t think the Casey Foundation should assume that the Dayton
story was as poor an investment as the original evaluation laid out.” 
Dayton’s experience suggests that if the Foundation could have continued maintenance
funding for a few more years, it would have continued learning, and the community would
have gained not only ongoing support but also the experience of success. “If the goal was 
to put some pieces in place,” noted one observer, “then five years made sense. If, however,
the goal was really to see systems or sustainable change, it was much too short.” As another
participant commented, 
It didn’t get broken in five years, and it won’t get fixed in five years. You just don’t change 
a mind set and a culture in that short a time.
The Dayton initiative suggests a three-phase approach perhaps of interest to comparable
projects on the drawing board.. Phase I would be an initial planning period after the grant 
is awarded: “Now that we have the money, let’s figure out what we really need to do and
get the agreements in place.” Phase II would be pilot testing and supporting operations,
where a large Foundation grant would still make a difference. Phase III would be a long-term
implementation and continuation phase, providing a maintenance level of funding for core
staff to provide needed planning and policy support, assuming benchmarks of success and
other relevant considerations.
Some elements of the Dayton experience, in fact, suggest that these kinds of community
change initiatives will generally demonstrate slow, incremental change. As noted earlier,
communities that appear ready for change may be the least likely to want or need to start
over. They may be most likely to argue that meaningful reform requires – one of Dayton’s
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themes – a much longer time-frame than New Futures allowed: “slow and steady wins the
race.” While Dayton may have originally appeared poised for reform – in part because of
the existence of a human services levy and other “good government” reforms – the fact that
much of the system was basically working meant that no one wanted to take it apart to meet
an outside organization’s idea of change. 
Codman Square Health Center’s Community Health Workers (CHWs) experience also
suggests potential value in grantmakers’ committing to an organization beyond providing
seed money. This speaks to the “time horizon” issue, as well as to the need to respect shifts
in plans that trial-and-error community-building make necessary. Health center staff, 
volunteers, and other community members were surprised and disappointed when the
Kellogg Foundation rejected a third grant proposal to support the CHWs. These workers
had achieved many goals and the health center was gradually finding other funds to cover
salary costs. Kellogg Foundation staff had supported, even publicized, the model – but said
they thought the health center should have found alternate sources of funding after three
years. Some might characterize this as typical of funders’ changing agendas or shortsighted
unwillingness to make a long-term investment; others might argue that fostering depend-
ence on a single funding source is unwise. Despite this setback, which included a hiatus 
and some cutbacks, the CHW program continues. The health center pieced together funds
from various local foundations, the Massachusetts Department of Public Health, and its
own operating revenues. 
Similarly, almost four years after Alameda County’s LTT program ended, observers 
continue to assert that it laid the groundwork for the Interagency Children’s Policy Council
(ICPC) and its systems-change agenda. According to Janis Burger of the Alameda County
Health Care Services Agency, 
LTT played a crucial role getting things moving. The LTT planted the seeds of talking about
interagency work and broke down some barriers. The county would never have succeeded…
without the LTT. The work, and the thinking, was critical.
Flexibility and Respectful Responsibility Over the Long Run
The community’s professionals, elected or appointed officials, and other leaders will resist
the proposal of any social change initiative if its potential benefits are unclear, or if they 
feel ignored or treated disrespectfully. Since these leaders will be responsible for sustainable
gains, they must be full partners. Funders, of course, should acknowledge and heed the
community’s experience, ability, and greater knowledge of local conditions; allow a program
to build on its own strengths; and maintain a delicate balance between prescription and 
support. Funders and grantees need to be flexible about goals and objectives, especially when
new information reveals community concerns, so that they can respond opportunistically,
avoid Marburger’s “hula hoop approach,” and leave room for serendipity – which plays 
an under-appreciated role in project success. 
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Codman Square Health Center is a prime example. Although its original Community
Oriented Primary Care proposal goal was to reduce infant mortality rates, the health 
center’s community survey and “civic action agenda” meeting revealed different community
priorities. The Kellogg Foundation was flexible, respectful, and got out of the way 
in approving the change in objective to addressing higher-ranked community concerns. 
By responding to the community’s expressed needs, the health center deepened its ties 
to the neighborhood with which it worked. 
Alameda County’s LTT also evolved differently than originally envisioned. As noted 
earlier, several problems arose in the first months, despite efforts to solve them. But before
restructuring could proceed, an opportunity arose that changed its course. The state was
seeking eight counties to attend a “Policy Academy” to explore ways to improve services 
and outcomes for families. Participating counties would have an edge in applying to be one
of five state-selected jurisdictions allowed to define outcomes and pool funding streams for
new service approaches. The Casey Foundation encouraged and approved Alameda County’s
transforming the LTT into a Policy Academy participant. Its role, though, was notable more
for what it didn’t do than for what it did: It didn’t demand that LTT explain and account
for each twist and turn, worry about formal identity, or pretend to understand local 
conditions and opportunities better than the grantee. In a sense, it got out of the way, 
provided strategic encouragement, and banked on the social capital it had sought to create.
Alameda County is likely to reap dividends for years to come.
Not all outcomes can be pre-planned. A natural tension exists between relatively 
unstructured capacity building and a controlled, imposed agenda. Funders and potential
grantees should address this issue early in the process. Serendipity should be not just allowed
but celebrated when it advances the program. If, for example, funders had ignored Codman
Square’s surprising survey results or the state opportunity for the LTT because “they weren’t
in the plans,” much community achievement might have been lost.
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This report traces the evolution of three different kinds of foundation grants in five different
settings – Savannah, Little Rock, Dayton, Alameda County, and Boston. Interactions among
the funder, grantee, and community members and groups varied considerably, as did the
results. However, two major patterns stand out: projects made continued progress after
grants were completed and original grant-making intentions took unexpected, often 
unpredictable turns, and changed to meet local needs. 
Additionally, a number of recommendations emerge, involving all aspects of the 
initiatives examined. 
Funders, in particular, should look for a sense of ripeness, identifying community leaders 
who are at least beginning to see the onset of possibility and to grapple meaningfully with
community-wide problems. Ripeness means that multiple sectors and forces are poised to work
together toward common goals. Often civic groups, public agencies, and others have no 
history of working together; at times, inter-agency suspicion and turf war must be overcome
through collaborative change strategies. A funder must be prepared to support or facilitate 
a search for common ground through these techniques. 
Successful funders promote community development by supporting community-based 
organizations’ active participation and building consciously on the community’s character 
and history. Such an approach builds enduring capacity and leadership. A striking theme 
in these case studies is that the foundations did not – and probably could not – understand
community conditions, needs, and capacity well enough at the outset to construct clear
models and approaches. As a New Futures participant said, “you cannot give a change
model to a community. It needs to come from them! but working with funders and 
intermediaries, people together can work to strengthen it.” In fact, the experiences of
Savannah’s and Little Rock’s New Futures programs and the Codman Square Health Center
strongly indicate that funder encouragement of community intellectual independence 
and assertiveness is a major component of effective leadership development. 
The full Brandeis study argues that foundation staff who win the community’s respect 
can make a big difference in helping grants bear fruit in the long run. From there, broad
community participation from all levels should be included from the start of the initiative
and throughout implementation. Buy-in from key institutions is obviously crucial to 
success. Residents in particular want to know they will have a say in the program’s progress.
And while collaboration is necessary for success, funders can help to make sure that 
all stakeholders agree on its meaning. Funders and community leaders alike should avoid 
dictating forced marriages between specific groups. Only trusting relationships are predictors 
of success. But trust building takes as long as it takes. That is why the report concludes 
that funders should consider the time variable more strongly in determining a project’s length,
depth, and breadth. Perhaps American philanthropies interested in neighborhood change,
family strengthening work, systems-change, leadership development, and the nexus 
between community-building and policy development, should consider that it may 
be more important to go deep and long than short and shallow.
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Conclusion: Searching for Patterns 
in “Change That Abides”
…funders should 
consider the time
variable more 
strongly in 
determining a 
project’s length, 
depth, and breadth. 
Certainly one additional lesson from the study is that, if nothing else, attention to 
leadership and professional development helps funders create an infrastructure that endures 
after the grant ends and is crucial if the project is to influence public policy. Although 
funders may tend undervalue these efforts, the ripple effects of leadership support persist
and often expand. In the sites studied, the funders often promoted relationship-building,
helped people make contacts that helped them throughout their careers, encouraged people
to work with each other in new ways, and pushed people to think “outside the box.” 
These strategies were valuable in and of themselves.
Technical assistance built on a sustained, collegial, locally directed, and site-specific approach 
is more likely to succeed according to the retrospective look in the full Brandeis study. 
A revitalization initiative without a strong TA component will likely be less effective. 
But cookie-cutter TA doesn’t work. TA that will enhance confidence and competence is 
usually more important to communities than accomplishing the outside funder’s short-term
goals. Only at the point of open, trusting funder-community conversations is effective 
and locally directed TA possible. And again, this takes time to work out.
Even the issue of lead entities takes on new meaning with the hindsight made possible 
by a retrospective study. We learned, for example, that a community change project 
can take on an incubator role with cumulative effects, helping to create and support other 
organizations that become forces in the community. The original entity may transform 
or even become overshadowed, but does this matter if the higher good of meaningful 
social change is achieved?
Action-oriented social change grants can help shape how the public looks at ideas (such as 
changing from a deficit model to an asset approach or teaching about the necessary ingredients 
in systems-reform) and help Foundation priorities (such as stronger families) become 
community priorities. These approaches can, in turn, generate and support related initiatives,
and change communities’ decision-making culture – perhaps promoting greater expectations
and appreciation of collaborative decision-making. The media, as a gatekeeper of 
the information the neighborhood and community receives, can help in these processes. 
To recap, when all is said and done, the Brandeis study documented that:
• Long-term benefits are not always obvious or predictable. All sites experienced at least
some longer-term benefits that were not obvious (or even predictable) while the grants
were active. Similarly, longer-term grants give grantees greater status and voice in the 
community, and likely have a better chance to change practice and culture. Multi-year 
funding not only helps ensure that the work gets done, but also builds trust. It makes
possible a phasing strategy that can support widespread community participation 
from initial planning through pilot testing through long-term implementation.
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Ripeness means 
that multiple sectors
and forces are poised 
to work together
toward common goals.
• Sustainable change in communities begins often with nothing more complex that 
“changing the community conversation.” Grants can stimulate simple things like just
bringing community leaders to the table with government and nonprofit organizations.
This escalates as it empowers local leaders and helps them speak more confidently, 
get results, and contribute to creating a more self-sufficient community. In many cases,
groups that are echoes of foundation-funded collaboratives build upon the base laid
before them, such as Dayton’s FCFC and Alameda County’s Interagency Children’s 
Policy Council.
• Funders and evaluators must be flexible about changes that grantees propose or that
respond to unanticipated circumstances. Foundations that encourage open feedback from
the community open up new possibilities. Bureaucratic or overly directive programs, 
and strict adherence to a project’s original identity, goals, and objectives – especially when
new information clarifies or reveals unexpected community concerns – are likely to block
creative new paths to success. 
How often do those of us in the social policy and community change arena wonder what
were the enduring results from interventions and demonstrations undertaken in partnership
with local communities? What is the change the abides when funders and their helpers
invest honest effort in particular places, hoping to spark innovation and collaboration? 
This synthesis of a longer Brandeis report uses “20/20 hindsight” to examine the long-term
effects of earlier investments and then to link outcomes to some of the strategies utilized.
What we found was startling in its simplicity. To achieve sustainable change in places 
and, by definition the families in those places, we must try to locate and understand 
the confluence of factors that signal a community’s ripeness for change, the presence of local
leadership, the availability of civic efficacy and social capital, and the commitment to 
the long-term. A theme running through all of this is the role of serendipity and the need 
to help social change activists to realize, or even embrace the fact that wonderful accidents,
twists and turns are as much part of the story of community work as formalized 
experiments. Both can contribute to tangible results for families living in areas of need
across the United States.
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Time marches on, but reports like Change that Abides by their nature capture only a
moment, and that moment is often long past by the time a report comes out. 
Thus many report writers feel like perpetual authors of post-mortems about people and
places from an earlier period. In addition to whatever documentary value that sort of
approach holds, the real value of a report like this is twofold: first, at its best it will begin
new and perhaps stimulate a different conversation among those whom the report describes;
people deeply involved in the lengthy and often tortuous journey of social change. Second,
it may organize ideas or raise them up in ways that those deeply immersed in the process
haven’t considered, and direct attention to whatever or who ever comes next. In that spirit,
the Annie E. Casey Foundation sponsored a meeting to avoid the "post-mortem" syndrome
and to begin a process of adding value and up-to-date meaning to the report.
On June 1-2, 2000, invited guests, including some respondents from sites described in the
report and other experts in community change came together in Baltimore to discuss the
report, Change that Abides. Independent consultant Rebecca Stone followed the conversation
carefully and shared her notes and observations with the Brandeis team. Using these notes
and other sources, we have identified the following three themes that build on ideas first
described in the report and add to them in important ways:
Theme 1:  The Foundation Role Must Respond to Core but Ever Changing
Community Needs
Many of the lessons in Change that Abides reference foundations and their grantmaking
strategies. In particular, meeting participants noted with interest the report’s recommenda-
tions that philanthropic support of community change calls for core institutional support
along with resources for capacity development, risk-taking, and getting the timing right.
There was also considerable agreement that the setting of realistic expectations and timelines
is absolutely central in work of the kind described in Change that Abides and that funding
strategies should somehow balance the twin goals of flexibility -- to meet unexpected but
promising opportunities -- and accountability or at least a clear vision of what impacts and
changes would constitute success.
Here are some comments on foundations and capacity-building strategies in our respon-
dents’ own words:
"We need always to remember that doing social change comes at a price. There is a cost to
being available to the subtleties and serendipity of change. That cost needs to be treated more
explicitly and factored into foundation grantmaking…"
"The effect of Savannah’s long-term support from the Casey Foundation was to create an
unusual degree of connection with the foundation and unique "degrees of freedom" within
the initiative. The endurance and reliability of support is critical to developing this kind of
freedom to do what needs to be done."
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Epilogue
"Community change is organic. We ought to figure out how to nurture it, not how to direct it,
especially from funders."
"The report wakes us up to the work beyond our own blinders. Practice has its own narrowness
- issues like training new leadership and getting infrastructure support instead of core project
money isn’t generally focused on in our everyday work."
"What if grantmaking focused on capacity directly (as opposed to investing in programs that
have capacity as a by-product)? If you do it deliberately, what would you get?"
Theme 2: Change equals Leadership plus Serendipity
Members of the review meeting identified strongly with the major theme of the report,
namely that success in achieving sustainable change can be captured in the following equa-
tion: C=L+S or Change = Leadership plus (Seeing and Seizing) Serendipity.
Participants at the meeting noted that this formula for change tends not to square with the
explicit, formal and planned strategies promulgated in part by foundations. This, in turn,
poses some interesting and even confusing questions for how funders might go about
financing the spurs to change, and how practitioners attempting to plan can be ready to
seize unpredictable opportunities. Change that Abides’ many case studies were seen as espe-
cially worthwhile learning tools under these circumstances.
The reviewers’ own words about leadership and serendipity:
"Community change means seizing opportunity. How can you hope to assess the impact of an
individual or an organization? The equation for change is the right people + the right energy
+ the right time."
"Philanthropy needs to look at kismet, and how to fund it. What the risks are of funding it,
and then take those risks. Particularly as it applies to funding infrastructure, i.e., people who
do the work that leads to serendipity and the ability to take advantage of it."
"Ripeness and serendipity and timing are interesting ideas. How do practitioners learn to
gauge readiness for certain kinds of initiative? Sometimes, for example, the same program
that fails to garner any kind of interest at one time gets embraced as the perfect thing two
years later. What are the clues for practitioners about when something will take?"
"What are the factors that throw the social capital "switch?" It’s not the money; it’s a conflu-
ence of factors, and particularly leadership. The best program idea in the world won’t fly
without a champion. Champions are people who embrace an idea as a life mission, not as a
40 hr. a week job."
"We need to think differently about the diffusion effects of leadership development. Even if lead-
ers leave an initiative, they take that experience and growth and perspective into their next job.
We need to think of project leadership as a broad set of values and skills to disperse throughout
this and other fields...that really gets us closer to the sustainable development goal..."26
Theme 3: Never Enough Attention to Power, Race and Equity
Discussions of community building often suffer from avoiding questions of social equity
and justice. Meeting attendees were similarly concerned that issues of power, class, race and
equity did not have strong enough voice in Change that Abides or for that matter, the com-
munity building and family strengthening fields.
Comments on Power, Race and Equity:
"Some change and the work we’ve put into it has just made entrenched power more 
sophisticated about how not to share that power. Knowing that, what should we have done?
What could we have done?"
"What’s missing from the analysis and work in the field is the failure of system reform
approaches to attack the front lines of the problems: racism, sexism, class discrimination."
"How do you build and balance staff and resident leadership that supports each other? The
report had a moving story about staff development, but what about the resident development?"
Looking Forward: Points of Agreement
There were a number of consensus comments on a variety of themes that bear mentioning
in conclusion here, if only to spark the next round of conversations that we hope will occur:
"The benefits of a retrospective analysis approach for community change efforts... 
The importance of capacity and serendipity and the challenge of funding them flows 
naturally out of the retrospective methodology..."
"We need to connect the various [summary] themes. For example, we should connect "follow-
ing the "noise" and the importance of "serendipity" to capacity building and the importance
of resident leadership. In many projects it is the neighbors who do the out-of-the-box thinking!"
"Connect the dots. We can’t forget that champions need an infrastructure underneath them.
That has to be supported as well."
"What’s missing is the question of cost, and the relationship of that to what community initia-
tive can accomplish. We have to be able to talk about what it costs to achieve what’s been dis-
cussed here, and whether that’s worth it."
"Think about the usefulness of figuring out some really big mistakes made by really good
organizations. If that’s catalogued for foundations and others, it might make risk-taking more
palatable, to know you’re in good company"
"Want to reiterate that there should be a double bottom line: outcomes plus capacity to
achieve. Like golf, the more we practice the community intervention, the luckier and more
skillful we get at achieving something." 
Andrew Hahn
Brandeis University, Heller Graduate School for Social Policy and Management 
Institute for Sustainable Change/Center for Youth and Communities
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